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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
- - • ?LAS BJfaOlimRS ENTERPRISES, a partnership, GUS PAPANIKOLAS, NICK E. PAPANIKOLAS
and JOHN PAPANIKOLAS, d/b/a Papanikolas Brothers
Fnterprise%
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
NUi-d.i-liSE SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, a
partnership; and SPENCE CLARK, and JAMES A. COLLIER, d/b/a FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE;
and the AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a Maryland corporation; and A. R. CURTIS AND SONS COMPANY,
a Utah corporation; and MARVIN R. CURTIS; and
WARREN E. SWARTZ and MARJORIE SWARTZ;
and ROBERT HONODEL; and BETTY HONODEL;
and MYRNE M. COLLIER; and JILL CLARK,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case
No. 13821

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS ENTERPRISE:
GUS PAPANIKOLAS, NICK E. PAPANIKOLA>
and JOHN PAPANIKOLAS

\ <K

I'lauitifLs-rosiMmdeiits SIH-K mandatory injunctive
ivement of a covenant running with certain lands
ii w;i< lcjxnvitu'lv violated hv defendant!*.
DISPOSITION IN TI1K LOWKR COFRT
The case was tried ti» Uf ••<>wv\ MJnh entered finding <>t' fad. «'oin'lu.-:ioii> nf iav and judgment {minting:
plaintiffs-respondents mnndntnn injunctive enforcement of tin- coviuuii.
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BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-respondents seek the affirmance of the
judgment of the lower court granting mandatory injunctive enforcement of the covenant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts by defendants-appellants
(hereinafter for convenience referred to as " defendants") at pages 2-5 of their appellate brief is in certan respects inconsistent with the facts as developed in
the court below and fails to refer to certain material
facts. Consequently, plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter
for convenience referred to as "plaintiffs")? make the
following statement of facts.
On March 24, 1954, A. R. Curtis & Sons Company
and the plaintiffs each owned certain parcels of real
property located in the Union Heights Subdivision of
Salt Lake County, Utah. On this same date A. R. Curtis & Sons Company and the plaintiffs, were jointly developing a shopping center on their respective parcels
in the Union Heights Subdivision. Consequently, A. R.
Curtis & Sons Company and the plaintiffs desired to designate and set aside certain portions of this real property to be used for automobile parking. They sought to
accomplish this by entering into an agreement on March
24, 1954 which designated and set aside certain portions
of their respective properties to be used for automobile
parking. Included in the parcels so designated and set
aside was the property which is the subject matter of
this litigation, ie., the East 50 feet of the South 152.5
2
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feet of Block 6, Union Heights Subdivision. This agreement was recorded on April 27, 1954 and characterized
all of the pertinent provisions therein as covenants running with the described properties. (Exhibit 1-P; Findings of Fact Nos. 1-5, E. 200, 325-26.)
In March 1969, defendant Sugarhouse Shopping
Center Associates acquired the assets of A. R. Curtis
& Sons Company including the property in the Union
Heights Subdivision. Defendant Sugarhouse Shopping
Center Associates at all times pertinent herein was a
limited partnership and defendants Spence Clark and
James A. Collier were general partners. (Findings of
Fact Nos. 6-7, R. 326.)
On October 14, 1969 this partnership and its general partners Clark and Collier leased a parcel of land
152.5 ft. x 132.5 ft. in Block 6 of the Union Heights Subdivision to defendant American Oil Company. (Exhibit
2-P; Findings of Fact No. 8, R. 326.) The leased premises included the 50 ft. x 152.5 ft. parcel in question
which was specifically subject to the covenants for automobile parking in the March 1954 agreement between
plaintiffs and defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center
Associates' predecessor in interest, A. R. Curtis & Sons
Company. (Exhibit 1-P and 2-P; Findings of Fact No.
9, R. 326-27.) The October 14, 1969 lease was subsequently recorded. (Exhibit 2-P)
On the same day the lease was executed, defendant
American Oil and the defendant partnership also executed a lease rider. This lease rider expressly acknowledged the existence of the covenant running with

3
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the land in question and the agreement between plaintiffs and defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates' predecessor in interest which created the covenant. Furthermore, this lease rider recognized that
defendant American Oil's contemplated use of the leased
premises might violate the covenant and agreement creating it. The lease rider between defendants Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates and American Oil also expressly contemplated the very remedy which the
lower court granted: the abandonment or relocation of
improvements made on the property by American Oil
resulting from the enforcement of the March 24, 1954
agreement and covenants therein. The lease rider then
provided for a ratable reduction of rent in the event
enforcement of the covenant did not render the operation of a service station impossible. (Exhibit 3-P; Findings of Fact No. 10, E. 327.) The lease rider, however,
unlike the lease itself, was never recorded. (Exhibit 3-P)
The trial exhibits and testimony demonstrate and
the trial court found that all of the defendants on October 14, 1969, the date of the lease and lease rider, knew
a portion of the propery leased was covered by the
covenant, that the defendants knew the use of the leased
premises contemplated by defendant American Oil Company might probably violate the covenant and that the
defendants knew such a violation might result in the
necessity to relocate or remove improvements made on
the leased premises,, (Tr. 87-88, 99-100; Exhibit 3-P;
Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 13, R. 200, 327-28.)
The testimony at trial demonstrated that defendants
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, Spence Clark,

4
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James Collier and American Oil did not inform the plaintiffs of the lease, lease rider or American OiPs contemplated use of the leased premises. (Tr. 88, 99, 107;
Findings of Fact No. 14, R. 328.) Two months after
the execution of the lease and lease rider, defendant
American Oil approved the construction of the improvements on the leased premises. (Tr. 80)
The record does not clearly establish the date on
which construction of the American Oil improvements
commenced. Prior to the commencement of construction
in approximately February or March of 1970, a 3 ft. x
5 ft. or 4 ft. x 6 ft. sign announcing the proposed construction of an American Oil service station was placed
somewhere on the leased premises. (Tr. 91, 93; Findings of Fact No. 22, R. 201.)
Plaintiff Nick Papanikolas first observed the construction of the service station in August 1970 when
the prefabricated service station was being placed on
the property. (Tr. 107; Findings of Fact No. 15, R.
328.) Plaintiffs immediately complained to defendants
and protested the violation of the covenant. (Tr. 107108; Findings of Fact No. 16, R. 328-29.) Plaintiff Nick
Papanikolas' observation of the construction in August
1970 was the first notice which the plaintiffs had of any
use of the property by American Oil or of any violation of the restrictive covenant. (Tr. 107-108; Findings
of Fact No. 15, R. 328.) The construction of the service station consumed approximately 90 to 120 days and
was completed in August, 1970. (Findings of Fact Nos.
14, 23, R. 201, 328.)

5
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Immediately following plaintiff Nick Papanikolas'
protest, there occurred an exchange of correspondence
between plaintiff's counsel, defendant Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Associates and said defendants' counsel wherein plaintiffs' counsel alleged and protested the
violation of the covenant and the latter denied the same.
(Tr. 50-51; Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 7-P; Findings of Fact
No. 17, R. 329.) The defendants refused to comply with
plaintiffs' demands that the improvements violative of
the covenant be removed but did periodically negotiate
the sale of plaintiffs' property in connection with the
alleged violation of the covenant. (Tr. 52, 114; Findings of Fact No. 18, R. 329.) When it became obvious
to plaintiffs that these negotiations would not be further
productive or fruitful, plaintiffs filed their complaint
and thereby initiated the case at bar. (Tr. 52.) Defendants Sugarhouse Shopping Center, Spence Clark and
James Collier counter-claimed alleging that plaintiffs
themselves had violated the 1954 agreement between
plaintiffs and said defendants' predecessor in interest,
A. R. Curtis & Sons Company. (Answer to Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint, R. 125; More Definitely Stated
Counterclaim, R. 156.)
With respect to the status of the Sugarhouse
Shopping Center at the time of trial, the trial court found
that the character of the. shopping center was substantially the same as it was on March 24, 1954, the date on
which plaintiffs and defendants' predecessor in interest
agreed to preserve for parking a portion of the property
now leased to American Oil. (Findings of Fact No. 21,
R. 201.) With respect to the availability of parking and

6
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the need for additional parking, the following evidence
is particularly pertinent. Plaintiffs own various parcels
in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center, including unimproved property in close proximity to the American Oil
service station. (Tr. 72.) Plaintiffs also own several
residential properties directly south of the shopping
center which they plan to develop as shopping center
property. (Tr. 104-106.) Certain property in close
proximity to the service station, while available for
parking, is of no particular value to the shopping center for parking because of the adverse contour of the
land. (Tr. 109.) There was also evidence that certain
parking areas north of the shopping center may not be
available for parking in the future because an intervening easement owner is contesting access across its easement to the shopping center (Tr. 101-104.)
The trial court found that certain improvements
had been made by American Oil on the land covered by
the covenant. These improvements included paving,
curbing, landscaping, service station sign, gasoline pump
islands, canopies, catch basin, phone booth and light
pole. The court found that these improvements rendered
the property unsuitable and unuseable as a parking lot.
(Findings of Fact Nos. 19, 20, R, 330.)
I. ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GRANTING OF THE INJUNCTION
WAS PROPER.
Under the circumstances of this case the trial
court's mandatory injunctive enforcement of the cove-
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nant was proper. The following factors extant in the
case at bar, both individually and in the aggregate, demonstrate the propriety of the trial court's judgment: (a)
the defendants' actual knowledge of the covenant, the
probable violation thereof, and the legal consequences
of such violation, all of which antedated the lease to
American Oil and the construction of the improvements
violative of the covenant; (b) the absence of evidence
of injury to defendants; (c) the continuing and prospective need for enforcement of the covenant; (d) and the
reasonableness and unequivocal language of the covenant.
A. The "Balance of Injury" Test is Inapplicable
When the Defendant has Actual Knowledge
of the Covenant and its Probable Violation.
The central issue in this appeal is the applicability
of the equitable principle under which courts balance
the comparative injury to the parties. The defendants
label this principle the "balance of injury" or "balance
of convenience" test and, at pages 6-17 of their brief,
argue that the applicability of this principle to the facts
and circumstances in the instant case requires the reversal of the lower court's mandatory injunction. Plaintiffs concede the existence and wisdom of the "balance
of injury" test but submit that this test is inapplicable
to this case because defendants' violation of the covenant was calculated, willful and intentional.
Prior to the commencement of construction of the
improvements in question, defendants entered into a
lease of the premises,, (Exhibit 2-P.) On the same day
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that the lease was executed, the defendants executed a
rider to the lease. This lease rider expressly and unequivocally acknowledged the existence of the covenant for parking. Additionally, the lease rider acknowledged that defendant American Oil's use of the
premises might violate the covenant and that American
Oil could thereby be required by legal processes to remove and relocate its service station and other improvements. (Exhibit 3-P.) Thus, the defendant Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Associates, the lessor, acting through
its general partners, defendants Collier and Clark, and
defendant American Oil, the lessee, knew that the service station would violate the covenant iot parking prior to the time construction was even commenced. The
defendants admitted this under oath. (Tr. 87-88, 99-100.)
They also recognized that a court of equity could enforce
the covenant by mandatory injunction and require that
the service station be removed from the property.
Defendants then compounded their inequitable conduct. They saw fit to record the lease agreement but
sought to hide their state of mind and knowledge of the
covenant by not recording the lease rider. (Exhibits 2-P
and 3-P.) Moreover, in spite of their knowledge of the
covenant, the probable violation of the covenant and the
legal consequences of such violation, the defendants
made no attempt to notify the plaintiffs of either the
lease or the contemplated use of the leased premises by
American Oil. (Tr. 87-88, 99-100, 107.) Defendant
American Oil then proceeded to construct the service
station in violation of the covenant. The lower court
recognized these facts and accordingly found that prior
9
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to construction the defendants knew of the covenant;
that they realized the contemplated use of the property
by American Oil would probably violate the covenant;
that they recognized such violation might result in the
requirement to remove the service station from the property; and that defendants did not inform the plaintiffs
of either the lease or thei contemplated use of the leased
premises. (Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14, R.
200, 327-328.) These findings were based on the only
evidence which was probative of defendants' state of
mind. They are consequently supported by sufficient
evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. McCullough v. Wasserbaek, 30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P. 2d 691
(1974); Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 P. 962, 964
(1915).
Given these facts, the "balance of injury" test is
inapplicable. This equitable principle is not applicable
in situations where the defendant knowingly violates a
covenant running with the land or knowingly encroaches
on the property of another. In such circumstances where
the encroachment or violation of the covenant is willful
and done in bad faith, the courts will grant mandatory
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court of Utah recognized this very principle in Mary Jane Stevens Co. v.
First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099
(1936). The Court in denying the injunction stated:
We do not mean to hold that in certain cases a
party might not be compelled to remove subsurface encroachments into the land of another,
where they were knowingly made without regard
to the other's rights and purely for the benefit
10
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of the party encroaching, and where it could be
shown that they were a detriment to the use of
the other's land and there was no laches or delay
in asking for the remedy. Every case must stand
on its own facts. 57 P. 2d at 1125 (emphasis
added).
In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151
P. 558 (1915) the Utah Court recognized the propriety of
mandatory injunctive relief in encroachment cases. The
Court denied an injunction to remove structures encroaching on public property but granted a mandatory
injunction to remove structures encroaching on plaintiff's private property. The Court reversed that portion
of the injunction requiring defendant to correct the public encroachment only because of plaintiff's failure to
promptly bring suit after discovering the nuisance. 151
P. at 563. The Court, however, upheld that portion of the
trial court's mandatory injunction requiring defendant to
remove portions of the building encroaching on plaintiff's
own property and specifically stated that plaintiff could
not be limited to a mere action for damages. 151 P. at
565.
The Utah Court has never been called upon to apply the above principles set forth in Mary Jane Stevens
and Pingree National Bank in a case where the defendant has knowingly, willfully and maliciously encroached
on another's property or violated a covenant. Other
courts, however, have been faced with such circumstances and have granted the mandatory injunctive relief requested. The revelant cases wherein mandatory
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injunctive relief was granted fall into two categories:
(1) encroachment cases; and (2) covenant cases.
In Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37
(1910) the defendant knowingly and intentionally violated certain covenants restricting the character and location of buildings. The court expressly rejected the
"balance of injury" test and affirmed the mandatory injunction of the court below. The court reasoned that
such relief should not be withheld merely because of the
disproportionate pecuniary loss to the defendant caused
by the decree. In this regard the court stated:

'

It has been found that the defendant with full
knowledge of the restrictions "deliberately at- tempted" to override them, and thus deprive the
district of the character given it by the restrictions. He took his chances as to the effect of his
conduct with eyes open to the results which might
ensue. It has been the practice) of courts to issue
mandatory injunctions upon similar facts. [Citations omitted.] Intrenchment behind considerable expenditures of money cannot shield premediated efforts to evade or circumvent legal
obligations from the salutary remedies of equity.
92 N.E. at 40 (emphasis added).

In Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167,100 N.E. 500 (1912) the
court reversed the ruling below and granted a mandatory injunction requiring defendant to remove the structures which violated a building line covenant entered into by plaintiff and defendants' predecessors in interest.
Defendants were charged with knowledge of the covenant and under such circumstances the court held that
the resultant injury to the plaintiff, if any, was immate-
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rial. 100 N.E. at 502. Numerous other decisions have
specifically rejected the "balance of injury" test and
have granted mandatory injunctive relief when the defendant knowingly violated a restrictive covenant running with the land. E.g., Williamson v. Needles, 191
Okla. 560, 133 P. 2d 211 (1942); Attorney General v.
Algonquin Club, 153 Mass. 447, 27 N.E. 2 (1891); Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 139 P. 976, 980-83
(1943); Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Ritckardson, 91
Cal. App. 606, 266 P. 570 (1928).
The second category of cases involving mandatory
injunctions are those where structures or buildings encroach upon the property of another. As in the cases
involving covenants the courts grant mandatory injunctive relief requiring the removal of the encroaching
structure and do not apply the "balance of in jury" test
when the defendant has knowingly and willfully disregarded the property rights of the aggrieved party. E.g.,
Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 111. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921); City
of Dunsmuir v. Silva, 154 Cal. App. 2d 285, 317 P.2d 653
(1957); Agmar v. Solonian, 87 Cal. App. 127, 261 P.
1029, 1035 (1927); AtmtiUia Protective Association v.
Wolfsokn, 244 111. App. 71 (1927).
In reversing the lower court's refusal to grant a
mandatory injunction, the court in Christensen v. Tucker,
144 Cal. App. 2d 554, 250 P.2d 660 (1952) delineated
guidelines to be followed at a new trial upon remand.
The court held that a condition to denial of such injunctive relief was a finding that defendant's encroachment was innocent and not willful. 250 P.2d at 665. In
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a subsequent case the Supreme Court of California similarly resolved an encroachment dispute. Brown Derby
Bollywood Corp. v. Hatton, 40 CaL Bptr. 848, 395 P.2d
896 (1964). The court characterized the crucial issue in
this manner: " [DJid defendant Hatton act in good faith
or did he act in willful disregard of plaintiff's rights hoping that a court would allow the structure to remain and
grant only a remedy of damages?" 395 P.2d at 899. The
Court in Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wash. 2d 143, 449 P.2d 800
(1968) required the defendant in an encroachment case
to establish by clear and convincinug evidence that he
"did not simply take a calculated risk, act in bad faith or
negligently, wilfully or indifferently locate the encroaching structure." 449 P.2d at 805-806. Thus, in determining the propriety of mandatory injunctive relief, the
courts closely scrutinize the intent and state of mind
of the encroaching party and, if the encroachment is
found to be intentional, do not apply the "balance of
injury" test. E.g. Id.; Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands,
124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (1951).
The same authorities upon which the defendants
in the instant case rely support the proposition that the
"balance of injury" test is inapplicable when a covenant running with the land is knowingly and willfully violated. At page 15 of their brief defedants cite Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Minnette, 246 P.2d 1025 (CaL
App. 1952) as authority for the "balance of injury" test.
This case, however, was subsequently reversed upon rehearing. The rehearing was granted in order to address
the propriety of weighing the relative hardships under
the circumstances. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Min14
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nette, 115 Cal. App, 2d 698, 252 P. 2d 642, 64748 (1953).
The court reversed its prior ruling and upheld the lower court's injunction requiring the removal of the building. In doing so the court charged the defendant with
knowledge of the building restriction and emphasized
that his wrongdoing was not an innocent mistake. 252 P.
2d at 648.
The secondary authorities upon which defendants
rely at page 15 of their brief also support! the proposition that the "balance of injury" test is inapplicable
when the defendant knowingly and willfully encroaches
or violates a covenant running with the land. Defendants rely on the annotation appearing at 28 A.L.R. 2d
679, 690 in support of the "balance of injury" test. A
subsequent section of the same annotation states the
general rule when the encroachment is intentional and
willful:
Where an encroachment by an adjoining landowner is intentional or willful, a mandatory injunction will ordinarily be granted to compel its
removal, ivithotit regard for the relative conveniences or hardships which may result from ordering its removal. Annotation 28 A.L.R. 2d 679, 705
(1953) (emphasis added).
Defendants also rely on 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions §§
57-60 (1969). However, in Section 58 of this article, it
is stated:
But relief by way of a mandatory injunction will
not be denied on the ground that the loss caused
by it will be disproportionate to the good accomplished, where it appears that the defendant
acted with a full knowledge of the complainant's
15
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rights and with an understanding of the consequences which might ensue, or that he has willfully invaded another's rights in real property.
42 Am. Jr. 2d at pp. 801-802.
The documents and testimony in the instant case
establish and the lower court found that, prior to the
construction of the service station, the defendants had
actual knowledge of the covenant; that the defendants
knew the use of the property contemplated by defendant
American Oil would probably violate the covenant; that
the defendants knew such a violation might result in
the necessity to relocate or remove the service station
which they proposed to build. (Tr. 87-88, 99-100; Exhibit 3-P; Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 13, E, 200,
327-28.) Notwithstanding this actual knowledge and
realization of the consequences of their contemplated
acts, defendants undertook the construction of the service station without even attempting to notify the plaintiffs. Such conduct constituted a ruthless, willful and
intentional violation of the covenant for parking. Under such facts and circumstances it is ludicrous for defendants to claim that the equitable "balance of injury"
test, which is applicable only to innocent and unknowing
conduct, should now relieve them from alleged hardships
caused by the lower court's mandatory injunction.
While none of the Utah cases relied upon by defendants involved such obdurate and ruthless conduct, this
Court has suggested in dictum that mandatory injunctive relief is proper when an encroachment or violation
of a covenant is "knowingly" accomplished "without regard to the other's rights and purely for the benefit of
16
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the party encroaching." Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First
National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099, 1125
(1936). See Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah
35,151 P. 558, 563 (1915). The Court must now not only
decide the case at bar but also must establish a precedent in this jurisdiction which will guide the future conduct of the citizens of the state. Plaintiffs submit that
defendants' conduct in this case compels a ruling, in accordance with the authorities discussed above, that the
"balance of injury" test is inapplicable under the circumstances. Any other ruling would be a dangerous
precedent which would for all practical purposes render all legitimate covenants running with the land void
ab initio, undermine the sanctity of contract and permit
any person to take the law into his own hands when another person's property rights conflict with his own desires, whims and caprice.
B. Assuming the Applicability of the "Balance
of Injury" Test, the Injury to Plaintiffs from
Defendants' Violation of the Covenant is at
Least as Significant as the Injury to Defendants Resulting from the Mandatory Injunction.
Assuming the instant case did not involve a calculated, intentional and malicious violation of a covenant
and that the "balance of injury" test might therefore be
applicable, the facts and circumstances still present a
situation appropriate for mandatory injunctive relief.
The injury to plaintiffs' interests resulting from defendants' violation of the covenant is at least as significant
and substantial as any alleged resultant hardship to defendants from the mandatory injunction.
17
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The plaintiffs presently are owners of properties
in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center, including unimproved property in close proximity to the American
Oil service station. (Tr. 72.) Such ownership was sufficiently significant in 1954 for the plaintiffs to enter
into mutual covenants for parking with defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates' predecessor in interest. Plaintiffs thereby defined a significant interest
to be protected and agreed with the other parties to the
covenant that the use of the subject property for anything other than parking would represent a substantial
injury to plaintiffs. Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167, 100
N.E. 500, 502 (1912); Morgan v. Veachf 59 Cal. App. 2d
682, 139 P. 2d 976, 981 (1943). Consequently, the opinion of any number of people, including defendants' counsel, that the breach of the covenant did not cause any
substantial injury to plaintiffs cannot defeat the covenant and preclude plaintiffs' enforcement of it. Hartman v. Wells, supra.; Morgan v. Veach, supra. The same
needs and interests which compelled plaintiffs to enter
into this covenant for parking in 1954 still exist today.
The trial court recognized this when, after viewing all
of the evidence, it found that at the time of trial the
character of the shopping center was substantially the
same as it was in 1954. (Findings of Fact No. 21, K.
201.) Thus, the same significant interests which plaintiffs sought to protect by the 1954 covenant are now being disregarded and substantially injured by defendants'
continuing breach of the covenant.
The evidence at trial showed that plaintiffs demonstrated remarkable prescience by entering into the
18
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covenant for parking in 1954. The testimony established
that plaintiffs now own several residential properties
directly south of the shopping center which they plan
to develop as shopping center property. (Tr. 104-106.)
Such development will put a strain on presently available parking and require additional parking. There was
also testimony that areas north of the shopping center,
which are presently used for parking, may not be available for parking in the future because the owner of the
intervening easement was contesting access across its
easement to the shopping center. (Tr. 101-104.) Additionally, certain property in close proximity to the service station, which defendants contend is available for
parking, is of no particular value for parking because
of the adverse contour of the land. (Tr. 109.) Thus,
plaintiffs' concern for adequate parking, which compelled them to enter into the contract creating the subject covenant, is still a legitimate concern. Plaintiffs
are, therefore, suffering irreparable damage as a result
of defendant American Oil's use of the subject property
which renders it unsuitable and unuseable as a parking
lot. (Findings of Fact No. 20, R. 330.)
Defendants contend at page 6 of their brief that
there has "never been a shortage of parking spaces nor
a need for additional parking area." Defendants rely
on page 74 of the trial transcript for this contention. A
review of page 74 of the transcript, however, reveals
that there is no evidentiary basis for this contention.
Moreover, defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates and its general partners filed a counterclaim
against the plaintiffs alleging that the plaintiffs them19
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selves had violated the covenants for parking. In support of this counterclaim these defendants alleged that
they had made numerous demands on plaintiffs to construct additional parking facilities on plaintiffs' property and that plaintiffs' failure to comply with these demands constituted a violation of the covenants. (Answer
to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, R. 125; More Definitely Stated Counterclaim, R, 156.) Consequently, defendants should not now be allowed to contend without
an evidentiary basis that there has never been a shortage of parking nor a need for additional parking. Additionally, the defendants' contention that no one had
ever demanded more parking is directly contradicted by
their own pleadings wherein they allege numerous demands upon plaintiffs to construct additional parking.
While plaintiffs' injury resulting from defendants'
violation of the covenant was significant and substantial, plaintiffs were unable to measure their injury with
a dollar figure and as a result did not prove specific
monetary damage at trial. Specific monetary damage,
however, need not be established to support an action
for injunctive relief. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302
N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177, 22 ALE 2d 1203, 1209 (1950);
Berstein v. Friedman, 62 Wyo. 16, 160 P. 2d 227, 234
(1945). Damages which are not susceptible to measurement in dollars are characterized as irreparable damages since the concept of irreparable damages has reference to the difficulty of measuring the amount of damages. E.g., Hiner v. Independent School District No. 50,
380 P. 2d 943, 946 (Okla. 1963); Crouch v. Central Labor Cotmcil of Portland, 134 Ore. 612, 293 P. 729, 732
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(1930); Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 111. 374, 130 N.E, 785, 14
ALE 828, 831 (1921). Plaintiffs' damages, then, being
of a nature not susceptible to measurement, or at least
difficult to measure, are irreparable. Consequently,
plaintiff was entitled to the equitable relief granted by
the trial court.
Under the "balance of injury" test it is of course
necessary to look at the quantum of injury to a defendant resulting from the injunction. In this regard, the
defendants in the instant case have put all their eggs in
one basket and rely entirely on the testimony of one
witness who stated that the American Oil service station would be rendered valueless if access to Thirteenth
East was cut off by enforcement of the covenant. (Tr.
77-79.) The credibility of this witness and his ability
to make such a conclusion, however, was all but destroyed when he admitted on cross examination, "I am
not familiar with the property." (Tr. 81.)
This witness's conclusion is rendered ever further
suspect in that it assumes enforcement of the covenant
would deprive the leased premises of access to Thirteenth East. The leased premises is a parcel 152.5 ft.
x 132.5 ft. Only the east 50 feet of the leased premises,
which parallels Thirteenth East, is subject to the covenant. A service station on the leased premises could have
been constructed in such a way that it would be compatible with the covenant and yet blessed with direct access to Thirteenth East. To accomplish this all the defendants were required to do was make a single access lane or set of lanes from Thirteenth East to both
21
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the parking and the service station. Additionally, access
to the service station directly from Thirteenth East
could have been provided at points north or south of
the east 50 feet which is subject to the covenant. Defendants presented no evidence regarding the availability,
feasability or their attempts, if any, to provide such access. Moreover, the defendants themselves admitted that
the operation of a service station and a parking lot on
the leased premises were not incompatible by providing
in the lease rider (Exhibit 3-P) for merely a ratable reduction in rent in the event the covenant was enforced.
Consequently, this witness's conclusion that enforcement of the covenant would render the service station valueless is itself valueless and unbelievable. By
his own admission he was not at all familir with the
property and his conclusion was based on the assumption that enforcement of the covenant necessarily would
deprive the station of access to Thirteenth East, an assumption without a factual or evidentiary foundation.
Consequently, the trial court, in its role as the finder
of fact, was on sound ground in disregarding this testimony.
Even assuming that this testimony is credible, it
does not establish injury to defendants. The equitable
principle of "balancing of injury" requires proof of irreparable injury and substantial hardship to defendants resulting from the mandatory injunction. Evidence that defendant will be deprived of substantial
benefits if the injunction is granted, however, does not
establish the required irreparable injury or substantial
hardship. Fairrington v. Dyke Water Co., 50 Cal. 2d
22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

198, 323 P. 2d 1001, 1002 (1958); 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions § 56 at p. 800 (1969). The testimony referred
to establishes only that the mandatory injunction would
deprive the defendants of the monetary benefits derived
from the operation of the service station. Deprivation
of such benefits, however does not establish irreparable
injury or substantial hardship under the "balance of injury" test. Fairrington v. DyJce Water Co., supra; 42
Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions supra. Consequently, it was
not established that the balance of injury favored the
defendants and that under the circiunstances mandatory
injunctive relief was thereby inappropriate.
Again assuming the credibility of the testimony that
enforcement of the covenant will render the service station valueless, it does not establish irreparable injury to
defendants. There was evidence that defendant American Oil made capital expenditures of $92,000. (Tr. 76,
97.) Part of this total capital expenditure represented
costs of equipment such as a prefabricated building,
signs, pumps, canopies, tanks, telephone booth, light
pole and other such improvements. Since improvements
in this category can be used at another location, the
cost of such improvements should be deducted from the
total capital expenditure figure in calculating damages
resulting from the lower court's injunction. Such costs
could have been mathematically computed merely by
reference to the books and records of defendant American Oil. The defendants, however, did not present evidence on this matter. While it is obvious that the defendants would incur costs in relocating their improvements, defendants neglected to offer any evidence on
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such costs even though these costs could be easily and
objectively estimated.
Thus, while there was evidence of the total expenditure by American Oil, there was an absolute void of
evidence establishing the measurement of damage resulting from the issuance of a mandatory injunction.
Since such resultant damages, unlike the damage to
plaintiffs, were peculiarly susceptible to objective calculation and measurement, the defendants failed to establish irreparable injury and substantial hardship
which they were required to do under the "balance of
injury" test. Farrington v. Dyke Water Co., 50 Cal. 2d
198, 323 P.2d 1001, 1002 (1958); Hiner v. Independent
School District No. 50, 380 P. 2d 943, 946 (Okla. 1963);
Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 111. 374, 130 N.E. 785, 14 ALR
828, 831 (1921). Counsel for defendant American Oil
admitted this failure of proof when he stated that no
evidence had been presented upon which the trial court
could render a judgment for damages to American Oil
upon its cross claim against the other defendants pursuant to the indemnity agreement. (Tr. 116-117.) The
defendants' failure to establish that the lower court's
mandatory injunction would cause them irreparable
damage precludes them from now contending that the
injunction was improperly granted under the "balance
of injury" test. Farrington v. Dyke Water Co., 50 Cal.
2d 198, 323 P. 2d 1001,1002 (1958).
In desperation the defendants contend that the "balance of injury" test favors the withholding of mandatory injunctive relief because the service station is a
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benefit to the shopping center and to the public. This
contention is totally irrelevant to any analysis involving
relative hardship and injury to the litigating parties.
It is a balatant attempt to inject the public interest when
no such public interest is involved. "The interests in
conflict in this case are . . . not those of the public and
of an individual, but those of the two private owners
who stand on equal ground as engaged in their own private business." Quinn v. American Spiral Spring &
Manufacturing Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855, 61 ALR 918,
923 (1928) (quoting from another case).
To argue the public interest as a shield to their
calculated and intentional violation of the covenant highlights the arrogance of the defendants. By so arguing
defendants in effect claim that they hold a private authority of eminent domain whereby they have the power to violate a lawful and unequivocal covenant because
in their judgment the public interest would be better
served by a service station on the subject property.
Rather than establishing irreparable injury and hardship, defendants contentions merely highlight the unique
accessibility of the subject property which renders it
equally beneficial to the public and the shopping center
if used for parking as contemplated by the covenant. It
is obvious that defendants have little concern for the
public interest and the interests of the shopping center.
Their respective interests are in reality to continue the
lessor's income from the lease and to continue the lessee's
income from the service station which had an above average sales record. (Tr. 76-77, 95-96). Such benefits to
the defendant, however, do not establish irreparable in25
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jury or substantial hardship which defendants are required to prove under the "balance of injury" test.
Fairrington v. Dyke Co., 50 Cal. 2d 198,323 P.2d 1001,
1002 (1958); 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions § 56 at p. 800
(1969).
The evidentiary basis for the contention that the
service station benefitted the shopping center was the
conclusion of one witness. This witness was an employee
of defendant American Oil and there was no evidence
that he had any experience in shopping center development. Furthermore, there was no evidence in the form
of traffic statistics or dollar volumes in support of this
conclusion. The basis for the conclusion was that the
service station had a good freeway location. Such a basis merely establishes the suitability of the subject property for a myriad of uses, including parking, and again
demonstrates that the defendants are not concerned with
the interests of the shopping center but rather their own
monetary interests. Consequently, it was within the discretion of the trial court as the finder of fact to disregard this testimony.
Even assuming that the instant case did not involve
an intentional violation of the covenant and that the
"balance of injury" test is therefore applicable, the evidence establishes that mandatory injunctive relief was
appropriate. Plaintiffs established irreparable and continuing injury resulting from the violation of the covenant. Defendants, on the other hand, were unable to establish that mandatory injunctive relief would render
the service station valueless and were unable to estab26
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lish the resultant quantum of damage when this measurement was peculiarly susceptible to objective computation. All defendants were able to establish was that
their pecuniary interests would be injured by mandatory
injunctive enforcement. Such proof does not establish
irreparable injury or substantial hardship which defendants were required to prove under the "balance of injury" test. Consequently, even under the "balance of
injury" test, defendants did not establish that the alleged
hardship resulting from mandatory injunctive enforcement of the covenant outweighed the irreparable harm
to the plaintiffs. Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize hardship sufficient to render mandatory injunctive
relief inappropriate when the defendants actually contemplated this very remedy prior to violating the covenant in question.
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Barred by Laches from
Seeking Equitable Relief.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are estopped and
barred from equitable relief because of laches. It is
anomalous that defendants should now be relying on the
equitable defense of laches. It was defendants' own inequitable conduct which caused this litigation. They
knowingly and willfully violated the covenant, fully realizing the possible legal consequences, and then failed to
notify plaintiffs of the contemplated violation. Defendants now claim that plaintiffs should be barred from
equitable relief because of their inexcusable delay. One
who intentionally defies a known right, such as the defendants in this case, is in no position to urge laches as
a bar to mandatory injunctive relief. Stewart v. Finkel-
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stone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37, 39 (1910); see Avignone
v, Roumel, 13 F. 2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Smith v.
Nelson, 149 Colo. 200, 368 P. 2d 566, 569 (1962); Baslego
v. Kruleskie, 162 Pa. Super. 174, 56 A. 2d 377, 379 (1948).
Even assuming that defendants can rely on the
equitable defense of laches despite their own inequitable
conduct, they have the burden of proof on this affirmative defense and must establish the requisite prejudicial
and inexcusable delay. E.g., Nadel v. Zeligson, 252 P.2d
140, 144 (Okl. 1953); Ferron v. Rossi, 42 N.E. 2d 564,
567 (Mass. 1942). In encroachment and similar cases,
such as the one at bar, the evidence of laches should be
clear and convincing. Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wash. 2d 143,
449 P.2d 800, 803 (1968). The defendants in this case,
however, have hopelessly failed to establish laches under
any standard.
The only evidence regarding plaintiffs' actual
knowledge of the construction of the service station and
the violation of the covenant was the testimony of Nick
Papanikolas. Mr. Papanikolas testified that he first observed the construction in August, 1970. (Tr. 107.) The
trial court accordingly found that this was the first
knowledge plaintiffs had of the construction. (Findings
of Fact No. 15, E. 328.) Laches cannot be imputed to
one in the position of the plaintiffs who is ignorant of
the facts and consequently fails to assert his rights.
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, 983
(1926); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d
528, 531 (1943); Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National
Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099, 1125 (1936).
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The defendants at this time, however, not only had
actual knowledge of the construction but also actual
knowledge of the violation of the covenant. (Tr. 87-88,
99-100; Exhibit 3-P; Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and
13, K, 200, 327-28.) When the defendant in a case such
as this has actual knowledge of the violation of the covenant and the plaintiff is ignorant of the violation, there
is no estoppel and no laches,. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v.
First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099,
1125 (1936); Finch v. Theiss, 267 111. 65, 107 N.E. 898,
901-902 (1915); Bright v. Allen, 53 A. 251, 252 (Pa.
1902). This Court succinctly stated this proposition in
Mary Jcme Stevens:
[T]here can be no estoppel when both parties are
equally ignorant or in equal knowledge that one
is on the other's ground, and certainly not when
he who is encroached upon is ignorant and the
other informed. . . Mere failure to object when
the other must have equally known of the trespass or both were ignorant does not raise an estoppel. 57 P. 2d at 1125.
Moreover, under the circumstances, the law did not require the plaintiffs to investigate or attempt to determine whether the covenant was being violated. Mary
Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., supra;
Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal App. 2d 682, 139 P.2d 976, 980
(1943).
Any failure by plaintiffs to assert their rights prior to actual knowledge of the construction was caused
by defendants' failure to notify them of the construction
and the probable violation of the covenant. Since this
failure to object was thereby caused and contributed to
29
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by defendants themselves, they cannot rely on this failure as a basis for the defense of laches. Nadel v. Zeligson, 252 P. 2d 140, 145 (OH. 1952); Gaskill v. Neal, 77
Idaho 428, 293 P. 2d 957, 959 (1956). In Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P. 2d 253 (1965) this Court held
that in order to rely on the delay of another in asserting his rights, a party is required to take some affirmative action. The Court stated:
[T]he burden of taking some affirmative action
should be upon him who accuses the other of delay; and unless he has taken such action or in
some manner put the other party on notice that
action is required, he cannot take advantage of
the delay. 404 P. 2d at 257 (emphasis added).
The defendants, then, cannot rely on the failure of the
plaintiffs to object to the construction prior to plaintiff's actual knowledge thereof because the defendants
failed to notify plaintiffs of the construction and probable violation of the covenant. Furthermore, under the
case law analyzed above, the defendants have not established the requisite elements of laches or estoppel
since the plaintiffs were ignorant of the construction and
violation of the covenant. Moreover, the plaintiffs were
not required to investigate or attempt to determine
whether a violation had occurred and defendants cannot rely on the failure of plaintiffs to object to the construction since defendants themselves failed to comply
with their duty to notify the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding defendants' failure to notify the
plaintiffs, they now contend that a sign placed on the
leased premises announcing to the public the construc-
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tion of the service station constituted constructive notice
to the plaintiffs of the violation of the covenant. The
evidence does not establish that this sign could have
reasonably conveyed notice of the violation of the covenant. The sign was placed somewhere on the leased
premises in February or March 1970. (Tr. 91-92.)
There was no evidence that this sign was placed on that
portion of the leased premises which was subject to the
convenant. The sign wras small, approximately 3 ft. x
5 ft. or 4 ft. x 6 ft.
Other than the testimony that the sign generally
announced the construction of the service station (Tr.
91), there is no evidence of the contents of the sign.
There is certainly no evidence that the sign reasonably
conveyed notice that the covenant would be violated.
There was no evidence as to where on the leased premises the station would be located. Consequently, any law
abiding citizen with knowledge of the covenant would,
upon viewing the sign, assume that defendants would
comply with the covenant. Since a parcel 152.5 ft x 82.5
ft., which was a substantial portion of the leased premises, was not subject to the covenant, this would be a
reasonable assumption. Furthermore, the station could
have been easily constructed and operated in a manner
compatible with the covenant by the construction of a
single access lane or set of lanes which would beneficially serve both a service station on the west 82.5 feet
and a parking lot on the east 50 feet of the leased premises. Moreover, since defendants were engaged in land
fill at the north end of the property, it would also be
reasonable to assume that defendants would provide ac31
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cess to the station at points north and south of the property subject to the covenants.
There was no evidence regarding either the activities involved with the construction of the station or the
time when the various stages of construction occurred
prior to August, 1970 when Mr. Papanikolas observed
the prefabricated building. Consequently, there is no
evidence that either the sign or the construction could
reasonably convey notice of the violation of the covenant for parking on the east 50 feet of the 152.5 ft. x 132.5
ft. leased premises. Thus, defendants presented no evidence upon which to base their contention of constructive notice. Even if defendants had met their burden of
proof on this issue, it would have been to no avail since
one who has knowledge of an invasion of another's rights
cannot rely on laches or estoppel when the other party
is ignorant of the invasion. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v.
First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 47 P. 2d 1099,
1125 (1936); Finch v. Tlieiss, 267 111. 65, 107 N.E. 898,
901-902 (1915). Certainly the placing of a sign on the
leased premises announcing to the public the construction of the station cannot satisfy defendantsJ affirmative
duty to give actual notification of the violation of the
covenant to the plaintiffs. Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah
2d 53, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (1965).
Immediately after Mr. Papanikolas observed the
prefabricated building, he contacted defendants regarding the possible violation of the covenant. (Tr. 107-108;
Findings of Fact No. 16, R. 328-29.) There immediately
followed an exchange of correspondence between plain32
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tiffs' counsel, defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center
Associates and said defendant's counsel. In this correspondence, plaintiffs' counsel protested the violation of
the covenant. (Tr. 50-51; Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 7-P;
Findings of Fact No. 17, E. 329.) The defendants refused to comply with plaintiffs' demands and completed
construction of the service station in August, 1970. It
is obvious from these facts that plaintiffs, upon acquiring actual knowledge of the violation, did everything the
law required by making an immediate protest to defendants. E.g., Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167, 100 N.E. 500,
501 (1912); Morgan v. Veach, 59 €al. App. 2d 682,139 P.
2d 976,980 (1943). .,
.
. hi :
^
T
Between the date of the last letter of plaintiffs'
counsel, September 1, 1970, and the filing of this lawsuit on March 6,1972, the parties periodically negotiated
the sale of plaintiffs' property in connection with the
settlement of the violation of the covenant. (Tr. 52,114;
Findings of Fact No. 18, R. 329.) When it became obvious to the plaintiffs that these negotiations would not
be further productive or fruitful, they immediately filed
this lawsuit. (Tr. 52.) Certainly no negative inferences
can be drawn from the delay caused by attempts to settie this dispute. Plaintiffs should not be required to incur substantial legal fees and file a lawsuit during negotiations for the sale of their property which, if successful, would have terminated their interest in preserving the subject property for parking. Defendants now
contend that plaintiffs' delay during this period and
their failure to immediately file the lawsuit constituted
laches. There can be no laches, however, when plaintiffs'
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delay in filing the lawsuit is caused or contributed to by
the defendats. Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957,
959 (1956); Nadel v. Zeligson, 252 P.2d 140, 145 (Okl.
1953). When the delay in filing a lawsuit is caused by
an effort to settle a dispute, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked by either party. Reading v. Keller, 67
Wash. 2d 86, 406 P. 2d 634, 637 (1965); GasJcill v. Neal,
supra. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot now rely on the
delay caused by the negotiations as the basis for their
contention of laches.
<•'' The defendants proceeded to complete the construction of the service station around the time Mr. Papanikolas voiced his protest. Thus, an earlier filing of this
lawsuit would not have prevented the construction of
the station and violation of the covenant. Defendants
were, therefore, not prejudiced by any alleged delay in
filing the lawsuit. To establish laches or estoppel defendants were required to establish prejudice and injury resulting from any alleged delay by plaintiffs and mere
proof of the delay, by itself, is insufficient. Mary Jane
Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456,
57 P. 2d 1099, 1125 (1936); Matvhinney v. Jensen, 120
Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769, 773 (1951); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528, 531 (1943); Burning%am v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, 983 (1926). In encroachment cases and ones similar to the instant case,
there is no necessity for early enforcement of demands
through legal processes when the plaintiff does not have
actual knowledge of defendant's wrongdoing until the
improvements have been substantially completed. Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37, 39 (1910) ;
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Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co.,
293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855, 61 ALR 918, 923, (1928). Since
mere delay in filing a lawsuit, by itself, without any accompanying prejudice does not establish laches, defendants' contentions are without merit.
The defendants in the instant case have failed to
meet their burden of proof to establish laches. Plaintiffs had no actual knowledge of the construction or violation of the covenant until the service station was substantially completed. Additionally, there was no evidence to establish constructive knowledge. Defendants
themselves failed to fulfill their' obligation to notify the
plaintiffs who were ignorant of the construction. Since
plaintiffs immediately objected to defendants upon acquiring actual knowledge and since the subsequent dela>
in filing a complaint was the result of an attempt to settle the dispute, no basis for asserting laches exists in
this case. Moreover, defendants should not even be
allowed to rely on the equitable! defense of laches since
they knowingly and intentionally defied the rights of the
plaintiffs.
D. The Covenant Was Reasonable at the Time
of Its Creation and Continues to be Reasonable.
Plaintiffs agree with defendants' statement of the
law at page 22 of their brief regarding the reasonableness of and purposes underlying covenants similar to
the one in question: "Restrictive covenants are enforceable only so long as they are reasonable and their enforcement relates to the purposes for which the coven35
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ant was created." In order to successfully challenge the
covenant, defendants must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the covenant is unreasonable and
that the purpose for which it was created no longer
exists. Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d
36, 376 P. 2d 940, 943 (1962). The evidence, however,
conclusively establishes that the covenant was reasonable at the time it was created, continues to be so and
that the purposes for which it was created are still in
existence.
The plaintiffs presently are owners of properties
in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center and surrounding
area, including unimproved property close to the service
station. (Tr. 72.) In order to ultimately assure the full
commercial development of the Sugarhouse Shopping
Center and surrounding areas, plaintiffs entered into
mutual covenants for parking with defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates' predecessor in interest. They sought to accomplish this purpose by covenants which would insure the continuing availability of
adequate parking and which specifically designated particular parcels for parking. (Ex. 1-P.)
The same needs, interests and purposes which compelled plaintiffs to enter into these mutual covenants in
1954 still exist today. The trial court recognized this
when, after viewing all of the evidence, it found that at
the time of trial the character of the shopping center
was substantially the same as it was in 1954. (Findings
of Fact No. 21, E, 201.) This Court has stated that when
the character of an area surrounding the property sub36
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ject to the restrictive covenants remains unchanged, the
conclusion that the original purposes of the restrictions
still exist is inescapable. Metropolitan Investment Co. v.
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36,376 P.2d 940, 944-45 (1962). Since the
character of the shopping center was found to be substantially the same as it was in 1954, the conclusion is
inescapable that the original purposes for the covenant
still exist.
There is an abundance of evidence, which defendants refuse to acknowledge, establishing that the availability of parking is presently inadequate and will be
further inadequate in the near future. Certain property, which defendants contend is presently available for
parking, is of no particular value for parking because
of the adverse contour of the land. (Tr. 109.) There
was also testimony that certain areas north of the shopping center, which are presently used for parking, may
not be available for parking in the future because the
owner of the easement between these areas and the
shopping center was contesting access across its easement to the shopping center. (Tr. 101-104.) Furthermore, plain tiffs' development of the presently unimproved property close to the service station will create
additional demand for parking. (Tr. 72.) Moreover,
plaintiffs own several residental properties directly
south of the shopping center which they plan to develop
as shopping center property and which in turn will further increase the demand for parking. (Tr. 104-106.)
Thus, the original purposes of the covenant, i.e., to fully
develop the shopping center and surrounding area and
to provide adequate parking for such development by
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designating certain parcels specifically for parking, still
exist.
It is also significant that the covenant and its purposes are not incompatible with the operation of a service station on the property leased to defendant American Oil. Defendants could have constructed the service
station in such a way that a single access lane or set of
lanes would serve both a parking area and the service
station. Additionally, defendants could have provided access to the station north and south of the property subject to the covenant. If defendants had constructed the
service station in this manner, multiple uses could have
been made of this property which is peculiarly suitable
for such multiple use because of the ease of access to
Thirteenth East and the freeway.
Defendants make numerous desperate attempts to
construe the record to their liking. They contend that
the record establishes that no one, including the plaintiffs, had ever made demand for additional parking.
(Appellants brief pp. 6, 25.) What the record really reveals is that one witness, who was a mere employee of
a defendant, testified that no demand had ever been
made on him for additional parking. The trial court, in
overruling an objection by plain tiffs' counsel, recognized
the limited value of this testimony and stated:
i

Well, he is just responding to a question whether he knows if a demand has been made and his
answer is, "No." I am sure the Court understands there are circumstances where a demand
might have been made that he didn't know about.
(Tr. 74-75.) .>
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The record unequivocally demonstrates that demand for
aditional parking had in fact been made on numerous
occasions by defendants themselves. Defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates and its general partners filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs alleging
that plaintiffs themselves had violated the covenant for
parking. In support of this counterclaim these defendants alleged that they had made numerous demands
on plaintiffs to construct additional parking facilities
on plaintiffs' property and that plaintiffs' failure to
comply with these demands constituted a violation of
the covenants. (Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, E. 125; More Definitely Stated Counterclaim, B.
156.) Defendants' further contention that there has never been a shortage of parking in the area is totally unsupported by the record. (Appellants' brief pp. 6, 25.)
A question on this matter was propounded to a witness,
objected to and never answered. (Tr. 73-74.)
The record clearly establishes the reasonableness
of the covenant for parking and the countinuing existence of the original purposes for which the covenant
was created. The same needs, interests and purposes
which compelled plaintiffs to enter into the mutual covenants in 1954 still exist today. This conclusion is inescapable since the character of the shopping center was
substantially the same at the time of trial as it was in
1954. Additionally, there is an abundance of evidence
establishing that the availability of parking is presently
inadequate and will be further inadequate in the near
future. Furthermore, the covenant did not unreasonably
restrict the leased premises since it was suitable for and
39
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compatible with multiple uses, including parking and the
operation of a service station.
E. The March 1954 Agreement is Unambiguous.
Notwithstanding defendants contentions that restrictive covenants are not favored in the law, such covenants do exist, are lawful and are enforced by this
Court even when challenged as being fatally ambiguous.
E.g., Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P. 2d 155
(1967): Schick v. Perry, 12 Utah 2d 173, 364 P. 2d 116
(1961); Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d
36, 376 P. 2d 940 (1962).
, , 4 .,,
Defendants' contention that the 1954 agreement is
ambiguous is anomalous in light of the reference to this
agreement in the lease rider executed by these defendants. Paragraph 19 of the lease rider first expressly
acknowledges the agreement and defendants' awareness
of it and then states that this agreement provides that
the subject property "shall be set aside as a parking
area." Additionally, defendants filed a counterclaim
against plaintiffs based on the very agreement which
they now claim is ambiguous and in which they admit
that the 1954 agreement, as a whole, is concerned with
the availability and adequacy of parking facilities. (More
Definitely Stated Counterclaim, R. 155-56.) Consequently, the defendants by their own conduct, statements and pleadings concede and admit that the 1954
agreement is unequivocal in restricting the subject parcel for parking only, that the agreement as a whole is
concerned with the availability and adequacy of parking and that the operation of a service station on the
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subject parcel is clearly violative of the unambiguous
agreement.
The 1954 agreement on its face is clear and unambiguous. Paragraphs I and I I of this agreement recite
the properties in the area owned by the respective
parties. Paragraph I I I sets forth the mutual covenants
in five separate subparagraphs numbered 1-5 (Ex. 1-P.)
Paragraph I I I sets out a prefatory provision for all of
the subparagraphs. This prefatory provision states:
WHEBEAS, the Company and the Partnership
are devolping a shopping center in the area,
covered by the above described lands and desire
to designate and set aside portions of the above
described land to be used for automobile parking.
(Ex. 1-P) (emphasis added).
Certainly the parties could not have more clearly articulated the proposition that the restrictions recited thereafter were for the purpose of designating certain portions of the property for automobile parking only.
The subparagraphs 1-5 follow this clear recitation
of the parties * purposes. Subparagraph 1 contains the
restriction in question and, after reciting the particular
portions of the property subject thereto, states that these
parcels "shall be parking areas for motor vehicles."
The remaining subparagraphs again make reference to
"parking areas." All of these subparagraphs are consistent with each other and consistent with the general intent and purpose expressed in the prefatory provision
that the agreement was concerned with property "to be
used for automobile parking" No more clear expression
of intent and purpose could have been made. Defen41
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dants have lifted a single phrase from a five page agreement in an attempt to support their contention that the
agreement is ambiguous and that their operation of a
service station is consistent with the covenant. Even if
the phrase so lifted is arguably ambiguous the application of the ejudem generis rule of construction renders
it unambiguous. See, Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339,
423 P.2d 155, 159 (1967); Schick v. Perry, 12 Utah 2d
173, 364 P.2d 116 (1961).
Defendants' final basis for arguing an ambiguity in
the 1954 agreement rests on the proposition that the
mere existence of subsequent unrecorded agreements,
which were never offered or received in evidnee, illustrate the ambiguity of the earlier agreement. In this regard defendants attempt to raise negative inferences
from plaintiffs' failure to offer as evidence the subsequent instruments. Certainly defendants cannot question plaintiffs' right to conduct their own ease in chief
and must respect the decision of the plaintiffs to rely
solely on the 1954 agreement.
The only concern which defendants expressed at
trial about plaintiffs' desire not to rely on the subsequent instruments is diametrically opposed to their present contention. At trial defendants expressed the concern that plaintiffs would seek to show that the 1954
agreement was modified by the subsequent instruments
which even more strictly restricted the property in question. Now, however, defendants contend that the subsequent agreements did modify the 1954 agreement and
thereby rendered it ambiguous. Defendants were planning to rely on their lack of notice of the subsequent in-
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struments in support of their cross claim against certain of the other defendants who were the former owners of the property. When plaintiffs' counsel stipulated
that he did not intend to claim a more strict covenant
as a result of subsequent modifications of the 1954 agreement, defendants concurred in plaintiffs' decision to rely solely on the 1954 agreement and the cross-defendants
were dismissed by stipulation. (Tr. 25-33.) Consequently, not only did defendants fail to properly object to
plaintiffs' decision to rely solely on the 1954 agreement
but they actually concurred in and stipulated to it.
Defendants now contend that plaintiffs' decision to
rely solely on the 1954 agreement "deprived defendants
of their opportunity to show the ambiguity in the agreement." (Appellants brief p. 28.) It is difficult to understand an argument like this which claims that plaintiffs
in conducting their case in chief deprived defendants of
their right to properly defend the case by not offering
as evidence certain instruments which all parties had
copies of and knew about. If defendants were legitimately concerned with plaintiffs' decision not to rely on and
offer as evidence certain instruments, the most logical
thing for the defendants to do would be to offer the subsequent instruments themselves. This they failed to do
and thereby waived any right to subsequently object to
the fact that these instruments were not offered or received into evidence.
The 1954 agreement was unequivocal, clear and unambiguous. The defendants' own statements, conduct
and pleadings admit and concede this. The 1954 agree43
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ment on its face is clear and unambiguous. Additionally, defendants waived any right which they even arguably had to object to plaintiffs' reliance solely on the
1954 agreement and waived any similar right to now
contend that subsequent instruments reflect the ambiguity of the 1954 agreement,
,\
F. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Based
on Sufficient Evidence and Are Not Clearly
Erroneous
The trial court's Findings of Fact in the instant
case, which were made pursuant to its equity powers and
support the Conclusions of Law and judgment, are based
on sufficient evidence in the record and are not clearly
erroneous. Consequently, this Court will not disturb
these findings on appeal. Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d
105, 369 P. 117,122 (1962); Mayer v. Flynm, 46 Utah 598,
150 P. 962, 964 (1915). Even if the record evidence
could equally support findings in favor of defendant,
this Court will respect and uphold the findings below
since the trial court had the peculiar advantage of hearing the testimony and seeing the witnesses. In a case
such as the one at bar where knowledge and intent of
the parties bear so heavily on all of the issues, these
principles are particularly applicable. Mayer v. Flyrm,
supra. Consequently, since the record fully supports the
trial court's findings, this Court can affirm the judgment below on factual grounds.
POINT I I
THE TKIAL COUKT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY.
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After having attempted to legitimize a calculated
and intentional violation of the covenant for parking,
defendants make a final contention to this Court that
plaintiffs' complaint should have been dismissed for
failure to name an indispensable party. The determination of indispensability is bottomed on equitable considerations. E.g., Toney v. White, 476 F. 2d 203, 207
modified on other grounds 488 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973).
A consideration of all the facts and circumstances and
the application thereto of equitable principles compels
a determination by this Court that defendant American
Oil's sublessee is not an indispensable party.
The determination of the issue of indispensability
is not a matter of law but rather a pragmatic consideration based on the weighing of the facts, circumstances
and relative equities. Rippey v. Denver United States
National Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704, 717 (D. Colo. 1966) ;
Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Manufacturing
Co., 263 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 1967). The
curious element in defendants' contention of indispensability in the absence of facts. After over two years of
discovery in this case, counsel for defendants moved
for dismissal of the complaint for failure to join an
indispensable party. According to the representations
of counsel, the alleged indispensable party was one
Peter E. Murdock who allegedly subleased the service
station from defendant American Oil after the commencement of this lawsuit. (Tr. 5.) Counsel for defendants
represented to the trial court that they were unaware of
this sublease until the Friday preceding the Monday
trial date. (Tr. 5.)
45
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Counsel for defendants made no attempt to formalize these representations by means of sworn affidavits
or testimony from Mr. Murdock himself or representatives from American Oil, the latter being present in
court for the purpose of testifying on other issues. Moreover, counsel for defendants did not even offer a verification of these representations in the form of a copy
of the sublease. Since the date of the sublease is uncertain, it can only be estimated that defendants had
between one and two years to bring this matter to the
attention of the court. Defendants' counsel had more
than three days to notify the plaintiffs' counsel of this
matter but failed to do so. Defendants now ask this
Court to reverse the mandatory injunction of the lower
court, which was issued after a full trial on the merits,
without having even made an offer of proof on the
following matters: (a) whether the sublease was oral
or written; (b) if the latter, whether the sublease was
recorded; (c) the length or duration of the sublease;
(d) the conditions of termination; (e) disclaimer of implied warranties; (f) the existence of any express warranties; (g) indemnification provisions similar to those
in the lease rider (Ex. 3-P) between the defendants. The
trial court could not grant the motion or require joinder
and this Court should not consider defendants' appellate
contentions on this matter when the defendants themselves have made absolutely no effort to present or even
offer a factual or evidentiary basis in support.
Defendant American Oil allegedly entered into the
sublease which it now asserts as a defense after this
case was commenced by the plaintiffs. Nevertheless,
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defendant American Oil did not bring this to the attention of its own counsel until three to four days prior
to trial. No reason is given for its failure to realize
the alleged significance of the sublease for two years
and then suddenly, three days before trial, determine
that it is significant enough to bring to the attention of
counsel for defendants. Defendants, then, allowed two
years to lapse without amending their pleadings to incorporate the alleged sublease. To allow the defendants to
now rely on the sublease allegedly created after the commencement of this action as a basis for reversal of the
lower court would be unconscionable The Court should
not allow the defendants to have the power to confer indispensability upon another at any time during litigation.
Defendants contend that the sublessee's alleged control and possession of the premises required his joinder.
One is not an indispensable party, however, merely because he has a substantial interest in the subject matter
of the litigation. Lubin v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
260 F. 2d 411 (7th Cir. 1958); Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp.
472, 473 (E.D. 111. 1941). Defendants then contend that
the sublessee is an indispensable party because the lower
court's injunction may require defendant American Oil
to violate the sublease even though it allegedly has no
possessory rights to the leased premises. Defendants
cannot make such a contention when there is no evidence
to elucidate the provisions of the alleged sublease which
delineate the conduct constituting a violation of the sublease. Moreover, contrary to the contentions of defendants, defendant American Oil does have certain possessory rights as a matter of law, including the right to exe47
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cute an order of a court directing it "to do any a c t . . . on
the land." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 210 (1965).
Defendants' finally contend on behalf of the sublessee that his rights wall be unnecessarily prejudiced
if it is determined that he is not an indispensable party.
It is difficult to find any prejudice to the alleged sublessee when he was on constructive notice of the covenants in the recorded 1954 agreement. If the alleged
lessee suffered any prejudice, it was the result of any
one or all of the following events: (a) his failure to
conduct a title search which would have revealed the
existence of the covenants; (b) the intentional failure
of the defendants to record the lease rider (Ex. 3-P),
which acknowledged the existence and consequence of
the covenants; or (c) the defendants intentional failure
to otherwise affirmatively notify the sublessee of the
covenants.
It is also significant that the alleged sublessee's
interests in defending against plaintiffs' lawsuit were
identical to the interests of defendant American Oil.
Consequently, his interests were fully represented and
he suffered no prejudice. See Toney v. White, 476 F.
2d 203, 207, modified on other grounds 488 F. 2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1973). Additionally, the alleged sublessee will have
an action for damages if the enforcement of the covenant
causes defendant American Oil to breach its sublease.
Cf. Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472, 474 (E.D. 111. 1941).
Certainly, it is no more harsh to require the alleged sublessee to litigate such a claim than it would have been
to require him to be joined and defend this action by
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the plaintiffs. Any judgment in such an action would be
wholly consistent with the lower court's mandatory injunction in the case at bar.
Considering all of the circumstances, it would be
a miscarriage of justice and a misapplication of applicable equitable principles to hold that the alleged sublessee is an indispensable party. Defendants have neither
presented nor offered any factual or evidentiary basis
for such a holding. Moreover, this Court should not afford these defendants the power to confer indispensability upon any third party. The lower court's judgment can be lawfully executed notwithstanding the absence of any alleged sublessee. The judgment itself does
not prejudice the alleged sublessee's cause of action
based on a claimed violation of a sublease and the mandatory injunction is fully consistent with any subsequent
judgment for damages in favor of the alleged sublessee.
Consequently, the alleged sublessee is not an indispensable party in the case at bar.
CONCLUSION
The circumstances of this case render the trial
court's mandatory injunctive relief particularly appropriate. Because of defendants' calculated and intentional
violation of the covenant, the equitable principle of "balancing of injury" is inapposite. Even assuming the applicability of this principle, the balance of injury substantially favors the injunctive relief granted. Neither
the facts nor the law can support defendants' defenses
of laches, unreasonableness of the covenant, ambiguity
49
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the 1954 agreement or absence of an indispensable
party. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH
Edward J. McDonough, Esq.
Michael R. Murphy, Esq.
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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